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In the author's view, an important result of the economic
reforms begun in Mexico in 1983, especially in the period
after 1987, is that national private groups have assumed a
leading place in the new economic model. These are not
only traditional groups which were restructured in the
course of those reforms, but also new groups which were
formed or developed in that period and which have come to
have decisive weight in the national economy. This new
leading role of Mexican national private groups is the result
of the strategies adopted by the groups themselves in order
to adapt to the conditions of competition created by an
open, deregulated economy as well as of the government
strategy of privatizing public enterprises, which fulfilled the
aim of transferring to national private capital the economic
power previously possessed by the sector of public
enterprises, while at the same time seeking to secure a
balanced distribution of that power among those national
private groups and to promote the development of new
groups. Section I of the article examines the performance of
the national private groups in the period in question, in
order to show their leading economic position. Section II
analyses the general features of the privatization of financial
and non-financial public enterprises, as well as the various
effects they had on those groups, with emphasis on the
restructuring aspects of them which underlie the
privatization strategy. Finally, section III gives a summary
description of the main national private groups in 1993,
though this is naturally of a provisional nature in view of
the changes taking place both in the national economy and
in the groups themselves.
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1
The leading economic position of
nationalprivate groups in 1987-1992
In Mexico, as in other parts of Latin America, na-
tional private groups (NPGs) are formed through the
conglomeration of ftrms carrying on activities in one
or more economic sectors. These frrms are of differ-
ent sizes, but normal1y each group ineludes at least
one of the big companies operating in the country.
Precisely identifying the leading economic position
of the NPGS would demand a knowledge of all the
frrms that form part of them, as wel1 as of the scale of
activities of each one of them and the overall results
achieved. In the case of Mexico, this is difftcult, both
because of the limitations of the available sources of
information and because of methodological problems
in their deftnitions of groups. In order to avoid dis-
torted conelusions, we have therefore considered as a
whole the available information on groups and the
major ftrms that form part of them. This section frrst
of all presents the elements that show the leading
position of national private frrms in the overall to-
tality of large frrms in the national economy, after
which the leading economic position of the NPGs in
TABLE 1
the universe of leading groups is considered, and fi-
nally sorne relations between the leading position of
national private ftrms and that of NPGs are explored
in order to help gain a better knowledge of the lead-
ing position of the latter. Both when considering
large ftrms and economic groups, ftrst of al1 the lead-
ing position they occupy as a whole is described,
after which the relative importance of national pri-
vate groups compared with public enterprises and
transnationals is identifted. These exercises are car-
ried out on the basis of the annual surveys made by
the magazine Expansión on 500 large companies and
100 economic groups operating in the country. 1
1. National private leadership among large
companies.
Since 1987, large companies operating in Mexico
have increased their weight in the national economy,
as may be seen from the indicators for the 500 largest
frrms mentioned earlier (table 1).
Mexlco: Indicators of the economlc Importance
of the 500 largest flrms In Mexlco, • 1987-1992
Sales/GDP (%)
Net profit margin (%)
Liabilities in major firmsl
Total Iiabilities (%)
Trade balance (mili ions of pesos) b
Number of staff employed
1987
20.01
625016
1988
20.27
622908
1989
18.51
698443
1990 1991 1992
18.16 21.60 24.67
5.1\ 5.32 6.20
27.06 34.21 29.35
31300000 34400000 2500 000
807616 621464 878052
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the magazine Expansión, Mexico City, Expansión S.A., and economic indicators
from the Banco de México (Banxico).
• Pemex is excluded from the total for the 500 largest companies in Mexico; data for the largest firms are used.
bTrade balance for 1990,1991 and 1992 includes Pemex.
o The data bases for this study were prepared by Anabel Correa
and Aurea Angélica Pérez, while Carmen Aguilar, Chief of
Special Projects of the magazine Expansi6n, gave assistance in
the analysis of that publication's surveys. The conclusions
drawn from this material are, of course, entirely the author's
responsibility.
1 Expansión magazine is published in Mexico City. A serious
limitation of these samples is that the companies and groups
that make them up change from one year to another, thus
Iimiting the scope of comparisons in time.
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For our purposes, the most usefui of these indi-
ca10rs is that showing sales as a percentage of GDP.
This proportion rose by over four percentage points
between 1987 and 1992: an increase which is signifi-
cant in itself, but even more so when it is considered
that it took place on top of a cumulative increase in
GDP between 1989 and 1992 of sorne 14 percentage
points in real terms.
Other valuable indicators of the importance of
this set of fmns are too employrnent generatOO by
them, which is estimatOO to have increasOO by 40%
over the period in question, and their trade balance,
which registers surpluses, although these went down
at the end of the period due 10 the increase in im-
ports of capital and intermediate goods that accompa-
niOO the growth cycle of the economy during the
period in question.
This positive performance by the big firms would
appear to have been accompaniOO by an upward trend
in their net profit margins, 10 judge by two of the years
in question, but this observation is not conclusive, be-
cause during this period there were other economic
forces which had a contrary effect on this margin, such
as the price stabilization achievOO through the applica-
tion of the Economic Solidarity Pact and the impact of
intemational competition as a result of the unilateral
opening of Mexican foreign trade as from 1987.
The growth in the big frrms' activity at a more
rapid rate than that of GDP was financed through in-
debtedness on both the international and domestic
finance markets. The external indebtOOness loo to an
increase in the proportion of foreign-currency lia-
bilities in the totalliabilities of the firms, thus revers-
ing the tendency of previous years towards a
reduction of this item.
This new indebtedness of big frrms in dollars
formed part of a more general change in the fmancial
position of the Mexican private sector. This change
was observed as from the beginning of the invest-
ment cycle propelled by private investment, when the
private sector went from a surplus to a deficit position.
From the macroeconomic standpoint, this private
sector deficit is being financOO through a combina-
tion of the government surplus and the external sav-
ing of which big firms are making increasing use. 2
2 The return of sorne big firrns to the voluntary international
financial rnarkets took place not only on the loan rnarkets but
also on the New York stock rnarket, through the issue of Ameri-
can Depositary Receipts (ADRs).
Now that this general picture of leadership of the
big firms has been establishOO, let us look at the relative
importance in it of public enterprises, national private
firms, and transnational corporations.
As might be expectOO, national private and pub-
lic enterprises, taken together, are the most numerous
in this universe of large firms. However, their relative
shares have changed markedly: between 1987 and
1992 the number of national private firms among the
500 largest increased from 366 to 419, while the num-
ber of public enterprises went down from 44 10 only 9.
This frrst evidence of the change in the relative
position of private firms reflects the impact on them
of the privatization strategy applied by the govern-
ment over that period: around 1992 public enterprises
represented only 2% of the units in the sample,
whereas national private frrms had come to account
for 84% of the total.
Furthermore, the absolute number of transna-
tional corporations in this universe also went down
during the periodo This fact is not conclusive, how-
ever, since there are other indicators which show the
growing importance of this type of corporation in the
present-day Mexican economy, especially in the non-
traditional export sector. 3 At all events, this numeri-
cal change in the share of national private frrms in
the universe of the 500 biggest companies is a frrst
indication of their new relative weight in the national
economy.
In order to weigh the importance of this change,
however, it is necessary to consider the relative level
of economic activity attained by the various types of
enterprises, as measured through their sales as a pro-
portion of GDP (table 2).
This performance indicator confmns the leading
position of the large national private frrms, since dur-
ing the period under analysis the overall increase in
the sales of the 500 largest firrns was equivalent to
4.66% of GDP, whereas the corresponding increase
for the national private firms was over 8%: i.e., 70%
greater. 4 In contrasto the sales by public enterprises
shrank significantly over the period: from 3.54% of
GDP to less than 0.5% of it.
3 For a recent analysis of the evolution and importance of
foreign investment in Mexico, see Peres (1990).
4 In the information on the relative shares in sales, Pemex was not
ineluded among the publie enterprises, in order lo avoid the correspond-
ing distortion that would have been eaused by the enormOUS size of this
enterprise.
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TABLE 2
Mexico: Shares of State, national private and transnational
enterprises in the 500 biggest firms, • 1987·1992
1987 1988 1989
Firms No.of Sales No.of Sales No.of Sales% (% of % (% of % (% offirms GOP) firms GOP) firms GOP)
State enterprises 44 9.00 3.5 22 4.60 3.10 23 4.80 3.37
National private firms 366 73.2 10.91 396 79.20 11.02 406 81.20 9.77
Transnationals 89 17.80 5.56 81 16.20 6.15 70 14.00 5.37
Total 499 100.00 20.01 499 /00.0 20.27 499 100.00 18.51
1990 1991 1992
Firms No.of Sales No.of Sales No.of Sales
firms
% (% of
firms
% (% of
firms
% (% of
GOP) GOP) GOP)
State enterprises 13 2.80 1.20 13 2.80 0.55 9 2.00 0.45
National private firms 411 82.2 11.50 404 82.20 14.85 419 83.80 19.14
Transnationals 75 15.00 5.46 82 15.00 6.20 71 14.20 5.08
Total 499 100.00 18.16 499 100.00 21.60 499 /00.00 24.67
Source: Data from Expansión magazine, 1988 -1993, Mexico City, Expansión S.A.
• Excluding Pemex.
The relative increase in the sales by national pri-
vate firrns is partly explained by the fact that they
capitalized on the reduction in the operations of pub-
lic enterprises, but this factor only accounts for an
increase of three percentage points of GDP. The other
five points must be considered as being due to the
evolution of the private firms themselves.
Finally, with regard to the share of transnationals
in total sales, the available inforrnation indicates that
this share went down by half a percentage point of
GDP during the years in question, although this infor-
mation is subject to the same reservations made ear-
lier regarding the number of frrms of this type in the
sample.
To sum up, an analysis of the sales made by the
different types of firrns in the sample indicates that in
the period in question national private firrns gained a
marked position of economic leadership, both
through the increased economic concentration due to
the privatization operations and through the good
performance of the firms themselves, which had a
more than proportionate share in the expansion of the
500 largest frrms, displacing firms not integrated in
this universe.
The economic concentration which benefitted
national private firms became even more evident
when the situation of the 50 biggest frrms among the
500 was exarnined in detail. For this purpose, a par-
ticular year (1989) was analysed. 5 The sales of these
50 firms were shown with and without the inclusion
of Pemex, and in the latter case an estimate was made
of the impact of the privatization of Telmex and the
Compañía Mexicana de Aviación, although this took
place after the survey made by Expansión (table 3).
The most outstanding feature is that the 50 big-
gest firrns represent a significant proportion of the
activity of the 500 major companies, since their sales
accounted for 73% of the total sales of the latter if
Pemex is included and 63% if it is noto Among these
50 biggest firms there are 26 national private com-
panies whose sales represent 16.8% of the total sales
of the 500 if Pemex is included and 23.57% if it is
excluded.
5 This year was chosen because it marks the beginning of the big
privatization operations which would naturally be retlected in
the leadership structure of the NPGs.
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TABLE 3
Mexico: The 50 biggest firms of the 500 covered
by the sample, • by type of ownership, 1989
Public National private Transnational
TS50/GDP TS501TS500 enterprises companies corporations
(%)b (%) c
No. % No. % No. %
Including Pemex 18.93 73.33 9 39.98 26 16.88 15 16.46
Excluding Pemex 11.62 62.79 8 16.28 26 23.55 15 22.96
Excluding Pemex, but wilh
privatization of Telmex
and Compañía Mexicana
de Aviación 11.62 62.79 6 8.69 28 31.14 15 22.96
Source: Expansión, Mexico City, Expansión S.A.
• Survey by Expansión magazine, 1989.
bTS50/GDP: Total sales ofthe 50 biggest firms as a percentage ofGDP.
cTS50ITS500: Total sales of the 50 biggest firms as a percentage of total sales of lhe 500 companies in lhe sample.
The sales of the 15 transnationals among the 50
finns are equivalent to 16.4% of the total sales of the
500 if Pemex is included, and 23% if it is not.
The picture changes significantly, however, if we
take into account the effects of only two of the privat-
ization operations carried out after the survey: those of
Teléfonos de México (Telmex) and of the Compañía
Mexicana de Aviación. The inclusion of these two com-
panies among the national private frrms brings the num-
ber of the latter up to 28 and gives them the biggest
share in the total sales ofthe 50 biggest frrms (31.14%).
This is particularly significant when it is also con-
sidered that the great majority of these 28 national
private finns fonn part of no more than 11 national
private groups, as we shall see in the next section.
2. The leading position of national private firms
in the economic groups 6
The importance of econornic groups (including NPGs)
in the Mexican economy is confrrmed by the data
frorn a sarnple survey of the 59 biggest econornic
groups in the country between 1987 and 1991.
Arnong the rnost noteworthy indicators is the beha-
viour of the total sales of this sarnple as a proportion
of GDP, which registered values between sorne 12%
and 15%, equivalent to proportions of between 60%
and 68% of the total sales of the 500 biggest finns in
the same period (tables 1 and 4).
6 Because of lhe limited information available, the analysis of
lhe economic groups only goes up to 1991.
As in the case of the large finns, during the peri-
od under analysis the 59 econornic groups increased
their irnportance in the Mexican econorny, as shown
by the fact that their total sales increased by the equi-
valent of alrnost three percentage points of GDP in the
context of product growth already referred too How-
ever, this expansion of the groups as a whole was less
vigorous than that of the large finns, since their total
sales increased by 2.78 percentage points and their
staff by 27%, while over the sarne period the corre-
sponding figures for the large finns were 11% and
40%. The explanation for this slower growth lies in
the different behaviour of the national private groups,
the State enterprises, and the transnationals, which
will be analysed below.
The growth in the activities of the 59 econornic
groups was financed by an inccease in their indebted-
ness, starting frorn the situation of low leverage
which they had attained thanks to the rapid reduction
in their debt between 1987 and 1989. Noteworthy
within the current increase in their indebtedness is
the increase in their foreign-currency liabilities,
which doubled their share in total liabilities between
1988 and 1991 so that they accounted for 50% of
thern, while in the latter year the 500 biggest corn-
panies registered levels of foreign-currency indebted-
ness equivalent to sorne 34% of their total debt.
Within this general situation of the econornic groups,
the national private groups turned in a perfonnance
which placed thern in a leading position with respect
to the State and transnational groups (table 5).
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Mexico: Indicators on the 59 biggest economlc groups, a 1987·1991
1987 1988 1989 199cf
Total sales/GDP (%) 11.92 11.65 13.30 15.30
Book capital/GDP (%) 17.56 15.39 16.89 15.38
Number of staff employed 477 629 479488 537468 602805
Leverage c (%) 89.05 58.63 51.70 58.37
Foreign currency liabilities of the 59
biggest groups as a percentage of
their total liabilities 57.99 25.86 47.17 45.76
14.70
12.69
607925
67.91
51.58
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from Expansión magazine, Mexico City, Expansión S.A., and economic indicators from
Banxico (1988-1992).
a Inc1uding State enterprises, except Pemex.
bSorne enterprises did not provide information for these years.
C Totalliabilitieslbook capital.
TABLE 5 As was to be expected, the national State and
Mexico: Indicators of leadership among the 59 biggest private groups predominated in the sample both ineconomlc groups, by type of group, a 1987·1991
Type of Number of Share of Book
numerical terms and in the magnitude of their sales
as a proportion of the total sales of the 59 groups.group groups sales (%) capital (%)
Over the period, however, there was a change in the
1987 relative shares of the national State and private
State b 5 17.6 41.5 groups, as the former went down in number and inNational private 44 68.5 53.0
Transnational 10 13.9 5.4 participation in sales between 1987 and 1989, sub-
Total 59 100.0 100.0 sequently disappearing from the sample altogether. In
general, this evolution of the State groups was due to
1988 the privatization of public enterprises, while the spe-
State b 4 17.9 37.7 cial situation observed in the last two years was due
National private 45 72.3 59.2
to the fact that no State group answered Expansión sTransnational 10 9.9 3.1
Total 59 100.0 100.0 questionnaire.
In contrast, the national private groups appreci-
1989 ably increased their share in the activities of the 59
State b 2 12.9 26.1 groups as a whole, occupying the space left open by
National private 53 79.3 71.6 the State groups and even expanding at the expenseTransnational 4 7.8 2.3
Total 59 100.0 100.0 of the transnationals. According to the data from this
survey, in 1991 these national private groups attained
1990 cb virtuaHy total domination in the sample, as they
State b made 97% of the total sales of the 59 groups. These
National private 53 88.87 93.35 data should be interpreted with caution,however, in
Transnational 6 1I.l3 6.65
view of the absence of the State groups from the
Total 59 100.0 100.0
sample as from 1990 and the marked reduction in the
1991 cb presence of the transnational groups, which suggests
State b that there may be problerns of consistency because it
National private 54 97.07 96.89 was not always the same groups which answered the
Transnational 5 2.93 3.11 survey questionnaires.
Total 59 100.0 100.0 At aH events, the available information indicates
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from Expan- that the modest expansion registered by the 59
sión magazine, Mexico City, Expansión S.A., 1988-1992. groups as a whole reflects the net result of opposite
a Inc1uding State enterprises, except Pemex. trends by the State and transnational groups on the
b No information is available on State enterprises because they did
not answer the questionnaire. one hand and the national private groups on the
c Inc1udes privatized enterprises: Teléfonos de México. other, because while the former suffered a reduction
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in their shares in the sample or disappeared from it
altogether, the latter's share in the total sales of the
sample increased by over 40%. In terms of GDP, this
share rose from 8% to 14%, reflecting their rapid
expansion in these years.
In general, and subject to the reservations
referred to earlier, it may be coneluded that the na-
tional private groups hold the econornic leadership in
the overall sample of 59 groups: a situation which
has been aided by the transfer of econornic power
from the State groups to the NPGs as a result of the
privatization process.
This general leadership of the NPGs has another
feature, however, which is the concentration of econ-
ornic power in the largest of them. This is confirmed
by looking at the evolution of the ten largest NPGs
within the sample of 59 groups (table 6).
Between 1987 and 1991, these ten NPGs increased
their share in the total sales of the 59 groups by 12
percentage points, thus coming to account for more
than half of them, which meant in 1991 controlling
sales equivalent to more than 8% of GDP. Since the
sales of these 10 NPGs represented nearly 60% of those
ofthe 54 NPGs ineluded in the sample in 1991, it can be
said that the new leadership of the NPGs under the new
econornic model in force in the country is based in
general on a notable concentration of economic power
in their favour, but especially on the econornic power of
this small group of NPGs just described.
To conelude this section, let us take a look at the
links that exist between these NPGs and the big Mex-
ican private frrms which lead the universe of the 500
largest companies. In spite of the limitations of the
surveys made by Expansión magazine which were
already referred to, sorne interesting relations can be
deduced from them.
In our exercise, we selected ten of the biggest
NPGs in 1992 and identified the number of flITllS in
each group, established which of them are among the
TABLE 6
500 biggest companies in the country, identified
those which have the most outstanding position in
that universe, determined their line of activity and
their position within it, and finally determined their
export performance on the basis of the survey of the
biggest export frrms made by Expansión (table 7).
The most outstanding fact is that all the NPGs in
question inelude frrms which are among the 500 big-
gest companies, and none of them is below position
No. 95 in that ranking (in one case the firm in ques-
tion was among the top ten ofthe sample). This could
be taken as an indication that these NPGS have an
important but subordinate place among the top-
ranking large groups, but in fact it is not so. It was
observed that all of them have two or more frrms
among the 100 biggest companies, and there are
cases such as that of Vitro, which has no less than 47
of its frrms among the 500 biggest companies. This
suggests that the manner of collecting the informa-
tion in the sample does not register the fact that it is
not a question of independent firms, but of 'members
of a group. If these activities were consolidated at
least at the division level, the firms in the group
would have a much more prorninent position than if
they were taken at the individuallevel.
Moreover, it was observed that the finns in these
groups are leaders in their lines of activity, which in
tum correspond to the most dynarnic segments of the
domestic market. Likewise, the frrms in the ten big-
gest NPGS occupy a distinguished place as exporters
under the new econornic model. Finally, the inforrna-
tion shows that in these NPGs frrms that have diversi-
fied investrnents, such as Carso, Alfa or Desc, exist
alongside those which are concentrated in a single
dorninant field of activity, such as Vitro, Visa or the
rnining groups.
All in all, the aboye indicates that the leadership
of the NPGs is based Olí the sound competitive posi- .
tion of the big firms that form part of them.
Mexico: Share of the 10 biggest national private economic groups
in the sample of the 59 biggest economic groups, a 1987·1991
(Percentages)
In total sales
In book capital
1987
44.03
31.28
1988
45.32
40.44
1989
42.97
41.52
1990
47.80
50.43
1991
56.04
55.12
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from Expansión magazine, 1988-1992, Mexico City, Expansión S.A.
a Including State enterprises, except Pemex.
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TABLE 7
Mexico: Indlcators tor the ten blggest national
prlvate groups and their Iinks with large companies, 1992 •
Number
of firms Rank Rank
Number in group Main firm in among Rank among
Position Sales of firms which are group which is the 500 Une of business within the 500
Group of group (millions in among among the 500 biggest offirm line of biggest
of$US) group the 500 biggest firms firms business export
biggest firms
companies
Vitro 3308.90 92 47 Vidrio Plano 76 Glass 24155/80
Carso 2 2554.42 6 6 Telmex Telecommunications 4
Alfa 3 2492.75 10 10 Hylsa 8 Iron and steel 2 43
Petrocel 41 Petrochemicals 5 14
Sigma 49 Food 6
Cemex 4 2213.20 42 18 Empresas Tolteca 20 Cement 52
Cervecería 17 Beer 53/58
Cuauhtémoc
Visa 5 2 100.10 106 7 Ind. Embotelladora 95 Soft drinks 4
de México
Novum 27 Petrochemicals 2 27
Desc 6 I 654.20 124 13 Spicer 17 Motor parts I 13
Univasa 73 Food 8
519112/48
Minera México 8 937.35 40 6 Ind. Minera México 21 Mining
La Moderna 9 921.57 15 2 La Moderna 16 Tobacco 75
Pefloles 14 732.80 30 18 Met-Mex Pefloles Mining 2 74
Source: Expansión magazine, series "Las 500 mayores empresas", "Las 500 mayores empresas exportadoras" and "Los grupos económi-
cos", 1992, Mexico City, Expansión S.A.
• The national private groups Iisted here are not the top ten in Expansión's survey of the biggest economic groups in 1992, as sorne of the
latter were considered to be unrepresentative for the purposes of this artiele. In selecting the highest position of a firm in a group, the highest
position attained by it in the period 1987-1993 was taken.
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II
The privatization of public enterprises:
a factor of change in the
national private groups
167
As in other processes of structural reforrn carried out
in Latin America in recent years, the privatization of
public enterprises in Mexico represented the disman-
tling of the "entrepreneurial State" in favour of a new
leading role for private enterprise in capital accumu-
lation. 7 In order to give an idea of the scope of this
change, it may be noted that in 1982 the Mexican
State participated in 63 branches of economic activ-
ity: intensively in 45 of them, through 1 145 para-
State enterprises. In 1993, in contrast, the State only
retained 264 of these enterprises and had completely
withdrawn from thirty branches of the economy
(Rogozinski, 1993).
The Mexican privatization strategy was carried
out in two markedly different stages. The frrst took
place under the De la Madrid administration between
1983 and 1988, and in it an effort was made to de-
link these enterprises from the budgetary point of
view. The second stage, which began in 1989, is the
most important for the purpose of this artiele, be-
cause it marked the effective transfer of ownership of
the big public industrial, services and financial enter-
prises to the private sector. The magnitude of these
operations can be gauged from the fact that the State
received over US$20 billion from their sale.
Although foreign capital did play sorne part in
this process, 93% of the privatized public enterprises
passed into the hands of Mexican big business
(Rogozinski, 1993). This outcome was not a direct
result of the economic forces, because in these pri-
vatization operations the enterprises were not soId on
the capital markets. In general, the system used by
the government for the assignment of public enter-
prises to private owners was that of competitive bid-
ding (auctions). Within this general system, various
selection and qualification mechanisms were used in
order first of aH to decide which businessmen were
7 For sorne general cornrnents on this process, see Muñoz, 1993.
eligible to participate in the competition for the enter-
prises, and then to assign them among the qualified
competitors on the basis of technical, financial and
other considerations.
From the point of view of the situation of the big
firrns and economic groups, these privatization oper-
ations were a great act of business re-engineering
guided by the State, whose strategy was aimed at
strengthening the big national private groups as ac-
tors in the new economic model, by transferring to
them its share of economic power.
This did not take place in a linear manner, how-
ever, as it was necessary to ensure a certain degree of
balance in the distribution of that economic power
among the various groups, while also promoting the
forrnation or development of new economic groups
to broaden the traditional top business leadership
structure, within a context of increased competitive-
ness of these big firms to cope with the conditions
that would be created by the new more open and
deregulated economy.
Mexican big business proved to be quite a ma-
ture interlocutor for this strategy in terrns of its ca-
pacity to take over the running of these major
economic units with a percentage of success which
has been reasonably high so faro
The resources for the purchase of these enter-
prises were obtained by many of the buyer groups
through the organization of financial packages in
which they themselves provided only a minority con-
tribution of capital, so that for these groups the pur-
chase of public enterprises also meant gaining control
of large amounts of capital from other investors.
In sorne cases, the capital contribution by the
buyers involved an asset swap from domestic public
debt paper to real assets of the public enterprises, as
many of the buyers of privatized enterprises pos-
sessed large amounts of such debt papero In other
cases, in order to pay for the enterprises they had
bought the purchasers repatriated Mexican capital
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held abroad, for which they were given special fiscal
incentives. Information is not available on the pro-
portion of this repatriated capital that was used for
the acquisition of public enterprises.
The most important means of financing such pur-
chases, however, would appear to have been the
procurement of investors' funds on the local and inter-
national financial markets. This has had sorne effects on
the subsequent management of the enterprises, since
they must offer attractive yields in order to satisfy
shareholders or meet obligations to creditors.
The process of the privatization of public enter-
prises took different forms, and also had different ef-
fects on the leadership configuration of the NPGS,
depending on whether the enterprises belonged to the
industrial and services sectors or to the fmancial sector,
so that it is worth considering the two areas separately.
1. The privatization 01 public industrial and ser-
vices enterprises
The key elemenf behind the actual privatization of
these enterprises was the divestiture of the cornmer-
cial and industrial enterprises which formed part of
the private financial groups at the time of the nation-
alization of the banks in 1982 and which had re-
mained in the hands of the State, although this was
not what was desired when that nationalization pro-
cess was decided upon.
The privatization of these enterprises was not
carried out publicly, so that it was not possible to find
out how much was paid for them, who bought them,
and how each sale was decided. There is sorne evi-
dence, however, which suggests that these privatiza-
tion operations brought about the frrst major
reshaping of the business groups in the context of the
macroeconomic reformo
With regard to the privatization operations car-
ried out from 1989 on, table 8 shows twelve of the
biggest operations carried out by the Salinas de
Gortari administration. As might be expected, the im-
pact of each of these privatization operations on the
economic power structure of Mexican private enter-
prise differed greatly, depending on the sector of ac-
tivity in which the privatized firm operated, its
relative size, and its market power. However, in these
cases of privatization of industrial and service enter-
prises no more general criteria than those indicated
aboye can be drawn; indeed, big differences are to be
observed between them which seem to be due to the
way in which the sectors in question processed the
privatization operations in each case.
It is beyond the scope of this artiele to consider
particular cases in detail, but sorne examples can be
given to illustrate the nature of those differences and
their effects on the leadership of the NPGS.
The frrst case worthy of note is that of Telmex,
an enterprise which was sold for US$1.76 billion to
the Carso Group presided by Carlos Slim, in associ-
ation with France Cable and Southwestem Bell. Un-
like the procedure followed in other Latin American
countries when privatizing public telephone com-
panies, in Mexico it was decided to sell the company
as a single unit, with a monopoly over the service for
a limited length of time. With respect to the Carso
Group, it may be noted that it was created by its
founder on the basis of stock market activities in the
late 1970s and gradually incorporated big firms oper-
ating in the industrial, cornmercial and services sec-
torso The acquisition of Telmex, however, converted
it forthwith into one of the giants among the groups
operating in the country.
Because of its size and economic importance, as
well as the type of management practised by its new
owners, Telmex has become a key element in the
functioning of the present-day Mexican economy and
has put the Carso Group at the head of the big na-
tional private groups.
In particular, this has been the result of a combi-
nation of the economic and technical role of this
company in the national economy, on the one hand,
and on the other the Carso Group's aggressive strate-
gy of selling Telmex ADRs on the New York Stock
Exchange, through which it has procured large
amounts of funds and put these securities among the
leaders on the emerging markets because of their
extraordinary yields.
This financing strategy has created a link be-
tween the Mexican and the New York Securities Ex-
changes, since two-thirds of Telmex's stock is sold
on the latter, while at the same time this stock is the
leader among the limited group of tradeable se-
curities which make up the stock price index of the
Mexican Securities Exchange. In practical terms, the
formation of that index and the performance of the
Mexican market are strongly dependent on changes
in the price of Telmex stock in New York. This
means that the evolution of Telmex has had a much
broader impact on the national economy than would
have resulted from its specific activities alone.
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TABLE 8
Mexico: Sorne privatization operatlons involving
non·financial public enterprises, 1989 and 1990
Enterprise Date of sale Purchaser Line of business Sale price(millions of SUS) a
Teléfonos de México 13 Oec. 1990 Grupo Carso, SW Bel1, Telecommunications 1760.0
France Cable et Radio
2 Cananea Mining Co. 28 Sep. 1990 Mexicana de Cananea Copper mining 475.0
3 Aeronaves de México 12 June 1989 Icaro Aerotransportes Airline 268.0
4 Compañía Mexicana
de Aviación 22 Aug. 1989 Grupo Xabre Airline 140.0
5 Sugar promotion 13 Jan. 1989 Grupo Beta San Miguel Sugar refinery 89.0
6 Conasupo, Tutitlán plant 23 Feb. 1990 Unilever Vegetable oil, seeds 74.5
7 Grupo Diana 27 Oct. 1989 Consorcio "g" Tractors, buses,
(Cummins) engines, etc. 56.0
8 Sugar refineries 1 Oc!. 1990 Corp. Indus. Sucrum Sugar refinery 54.5
9 Mexinox 23 March 1990 Ahorrinox Iron and steel 47.6
10 Sugar refineries 19 June 1990 Anerrnmex Sugar refinery 42.6
Source: Laura Carlsen, Changing Hands: Mexico's privatization program proceeds in !he transfer of State-owned to private hands, Business
Mexico, vol. 1, June 1991, p. 32. Quoted in Nora Lustig, The Remaking 01 the &onomy, Washington,D.C., The Brookings InstilUtion,
1992, p. 106.
a For conversions into pesos, the exchange rate at !he date of sale must be used.
With regard to its corporate performance,
Telmex is engaged in a big investrnent cycle worth
over US$8 billion for the renovation and updating of
the national telephone service. However, Telmex is
being threatened earlier than expected by new na-
tional competitors associated with big transnational
telephone companies. On the one hand there is Alejo
Peralta's Iusacell cellular telephone group, which is
taking active steps to secure authorization to compete
with Telmex, while in the banking field Banamex-
Accival -the other giant new group formed in the last
few years, to which further reference will be made
later- is also developing a telephone company to
compete on the local and international markets.
Another privatization operation, which is
worth mentioning because of its different effects
and results compared with that of Telmex, is the
sale of the Cananea copper mine, which is one of
the biggest open-cast mines in the world. This
mine was bought by the Minera México industrial
group, headed by Jorge Larrea, a member of tradi-
tional Mexican big business. Through this acquisi-
tion, the new owners gained a virtual monopoly of
the Mexican copper market and made the firm
into the fourth largest copper producer in the world,
strengthening their presence among the leading ten
NPGs in 1992 (table 6).
A third privatization case is that of the two big
national aviation companies, Aeronaves de México
and Compañía Mexicana de Aviación, which be-
longed to the State to different degrees. This privatiz-
ation operation is different from those mentioned
earlier for various reasons. Firstly, the sale of these
companies took place together with the deregulation
of this sector, leading to the appearance of various air
transport companies· which were smaller but never-
theless had the capacity to compete on some internal
routes. The most successful of these was TAESA,
which initially belonged to the Hermes Group,
headed by Carlos Hank Rhon, but was then sold to a
group of private businessmen who, through a policy
of highly aggressive fares, are having a fair amount
of success within the somewhat troubled situation of
this industry worldwide.
Aeronaves de México (Aeroméxico) and the
Compañía Mexicana de Aviación, for their part, were
sold to the Icaro and Xabre groups, respectively, thus
maintaining the duopoly which has traditionally
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dominated Mexican air transport on the large-scale
domestic market. The Compañía Mexicana de Avia-
ción, however, has suffered serious economic and
financial problems and has had to accept agreements
to integrate with Aeroméxico, resulting in a virtual
national private monopoly in the sector.
There is a fourth privatization example which is
worthy of special mention, namely, that of the sugar
refmeries, which has so far been the least successful
of al!. The sugar refineries which have now been
privatized had been absorbed in previous decades by
the State because of their serious economic problems.
They were retumed to private ownership in recent
years, but soon the 12 privatized sugar refineries
again ran into serious economic problerns which
have brought them to a state of bankruptcy. ClearIy,
then, the structural crisis of the sector was not solved
through privatization. Strictly speaking, the actual
privatization process has not yet been completed,
since the new owners still owe the State 30% of the
value of the enterprises fixed at the auctions. A way
out of this sectoral crisis seems to be taking shape
with an offer to purchase sorne of the refineries by
the Grupo Escorpión (GEMEX), headed by Eduardo
Molina, which has the Pepsi-Cola franchise for
Mexico (one of the biggest in the world) and is
interested in buying these refineries in order to
integrate its production process.
The fifth and last privatization case given here is
of interest because it is an example of how privatiza-
tion can lead to the emergence of new business
groups. It concems the sale of two independent pub-
lic enterprises -the Dina truck factory and the Micon-
sa maize processing company- which formed part of
the Conasupo public enterprise complexo They were
purchased by two different groups, but they have
continued to have links with each other because both
groups are headed by Raymundo Gómez Flores, a
Jalisco businessman who had previously had a mod-
est entrepreneurial career but who also bought one of
the privatized banks (the Banca Cremi) in the same
process. This explosive expansion of the business ac-
tivities of the groups headed by Gómez Flores was
crowned with notable success not only in the case of
the truck factory but also in that of the maize pro-
cessing firm, even though the former has to compete
with Mercedes Benz and the latter with the Maseca
company, which has a solid position in both the local
and United States markets.
2. The privatization of public financial enterprises
The large-scale privatization of public financial en-
terprises carried out in the 1990s revolved around the
18 cornmercial banks which formed part of the sys-
tem and had been in the hands of the State since therr
nationalization in 1982. The most important antece-
dent for this privatization process was the divestiture
of the stockbroking and investment firms which had
remained integrated with the banks when the latter
were nationalized and which were sold off in 1984.
This privatization of the banks differs from that of
the public enterprises in the industrial and services sectors
because it had sorne general features of its own in addi-
tion to those indicated at the beginning of this section.
Firstly, it took place within a broad prograrnme of
fmancial reforrns designed to deregulate, liberalize and
open up the Mexican financial system with the airo of
creating the right conditions for a type ofcapital forma-
tion in keeping with the investrnent needs of the new
economic modelo Within this general process of reform,
changes were also made in the legislation on interme-
diaries, so that those who acquired banks could form
financial groups or universal banking enterprises
headed by a bank, a stockbroking and investrnent
firm or a holding fmn. Thus, the privatization of the
banks not only involved their sale to Mexican private
citizens but also the restoration of the fmancial
groups which had been the form of financial interme-
diary that existed before nationalization.
Secondly, the extensive scope of these new groups
must be emphasized, for although the official rules did
not authorize relations between these groups and industry,
in actual fact sorne banks were adjudicated to powerful
industrial groups, both traditional and newly-established,
so that this privatization process also rneant the reappear-
ance of industrial-financial groups in the country.
The privatization of the banks thus brought with
it profound changes in the configuration of the NPGs,
both in terrns of their general systerns of organization
and operation and in the actual links whereby they
are formed. This explains the special features of the
bank auction process,8 since through it the State out-
lined a central element of the new profile that na-
tional private enterprise was to have in Mexico, and
it therefore caBed for a delicate balance in the adjudi-
cation of these institutions (table 9).
8 For a detailed report on the formal aspects of this process, see
Ortiz, 1993.
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TABLE9
Mexico: Privatized banks, ranked in arder of their territorial coverage
Amount Price/ Stock
Name Purchasing group President of group Origin of Region Date of paid book boughtpurchasers purchase (millions
ofUS$) value (%)
National Banamex Accival/regional R. HemándezJA. Harp Stockbroking and Mexico City 26 Aug. 1991 3 189.23 2.63 70.72
groups investment group
Bancomer Vamsa!regional groups Eugenio Garza Laguera Visa Nuevo León 28 Oct. 1991 2791.28 2.99 56.00
Señm Obsa/regional groups Adrián Sada Vitro Nuevo León and 27 June 1991 936.92 2.69 51.00
z Mexico City
~ Banco Internacional Prime Antonio del Valle! Industry Mexico City 28 June 1992 475.19 2.95 51.00(5
z Juan Sánchez Navarro
Jo
ro Multibanco Comemex Inverlat Agusún Legorreta Stockbroking and Mexico City lO Feb. 1992 883.26 3.73 66.54 o
.... m
al investrnent group ....
<~ Banca Cremi Interests from Jalisco Raymundo Gómez Flores Dina - trucks Guadalajara 29 June 1991 247.93 3.40 66.73 Jo
m ro
G)
Carlos Cabal Peniche Agroindustry Southeast 11 Nov. 1991 285.84 2.68 ::ti::ti Unión (ex BCH) Interests from 100.0o m
e the Southeast <;S Banco Mexicano Somex Inverméxico Carlos Gómez y Gómez Grupo Desc Mexico City 5 March 1992 611.96 3.31 81.62 -Z m~¡¡: Multiregional Multibanco Mercantil Probursa J.M.Madariaga Stockbroking· and Mexico City 10 June 1991 202.44 2.66 77.89m
...~ investrnent group lo>o
.P Banpaís Mexival Angel Rodríguez Transport Mexico City 17 June 1991 180.57 3.03 100.0
i and the Northeast Jo~ Bancrecer Interests from Mexico Roberto Alcántara Transport States of Mexico, 19 Aug. 1991 139.68 2.53 100.0 e
i§ City and Guanajuato Gto., etc. G)e
Banco del Atlántico GBM Stockbroking and Mexico City 29 March 1992 479.13 5.30 68.85 t/I
-4
o investrnent group
m Banoro Estrategia Bursátil Stockbroking and Sinaloa July 1992 365.09 3.95 66.03lñ lEo investment groupG)
Jo
293.19 3.73 78.68::ti Regional Banca Confía Abaco Jorge Lankenau Stockbroking and Nuevo León 5 August 1991
::ti
8 investrnent group
Banco de Oriente Grupo Margen Marcelo Margain Stockbroking and North and Centre 12 June 1991 73.95 4.04 66.00
investrnent group
Banco Promex Finamex Stockbroking and Jalisco 4 May 1992 346.84 4.23 66.34
investrnent group
Banco del Centro Multivalores Stockbroking and Mexico City, 7 June 1992 278.79 4.65 66.31
investrnent group Jalisco
Banorte Maseca!Gamesa Roberto Barrera! Agroindustry Nuevo León 14 June 1992 569.44 4.25 66.00
Alberto Santos de Hoyos
Average or total 12 350.73 3.5 72.2
Source: Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público de México. I~
...
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This was reflected, on the one hand, in the care-
fui pre-classification of prospective purchasers of
these enterprises, which excluded groups that had
had great banking power, such as the group headed
by Manuel Espinoza Yglesias, the former owner of
Bancomer. On the other hand, an entrée to the bank-
ing world was given to the new financial power
generated by the stockbroking and investment firms
during the 1980s, as symbolized by the case of Acci-
val, whose acquisition of Banamex turned it into a
financial agent of international importance.
At the same time, however, the government took
precautions to ensure that national financial power
was not excessively concentrated in the stockbroking
and investrnent sector, so that it also admitted the
traditional industrial groups into the bank privatiza-
tion process. Thus, two of the three biggest banks in
the country (Bancomer-Visa and Serfín-Vitro) became
the property of traditional Monterrey groups, and two
smaller banks also passed into the hands of groups
from that city, while sorne of the leading industrial
groups from Mexico City were also incorporated in
the process indirectly, as in the case of the Desc
Group, linked with the Inverméxico stockbroking
and investrnent firm, which bought the former Banco
Mexicano Somex, now called the Banco Mexicano.
The privatization of banks also made possible the
establishment or consolidation of strong regional
groups connected with manufacturing or agroindustry.
A noteworthy case in this respect, already referred to
ear1ier, is that of the Banca Cremi, which was acquired
by the Raymundo Gómez Flores group, or the Banco
BCH, which became the property of the Southeastern
group headed by Carlos Cabal Peniche, who had re-
cently gained control of the Del Monte Corporation,
one of the biggest fruit and vegetable packing firms in
the world. This group then gained control of the Banca
Cremi by purchasing part of its equity from the Gómez
Flores group. Finally, mention may be made of the case
of Banorte, which was bought by a group headed by
Roberto González Barrera, who is also the owner of
Maseca, the fiour milling firm that competes with the
company bought from the State by Gómez Flores.
Banks were also adjudicated to two groups that
exercised major control over transport under the for-
mer system of public regulation of the sector. The
first is that of Roberto Alcántara, which first bought
Bancrecer and then Banoro from the groups which
had acquired them in the privatization process, and
the other is the group of Angel Rodríguez, who had
first bought the Banpaís bank and formed a fmancial
group with the Mexival stockbroking and investrnent
firmo This group subsequently increased its financial
importance when it was adjudicated the Asemex in-
surance company: a public enterprise which provided
all the State insurance and has great weight among
the insurance companies of the country.
A special feature of these privatization oper-
ations was that in them the government showed great
concern to ensure that the groups acquiring banks
had a broad base of shareholders in sorne region of
the country, seeking in this way to guarantee that the
new banking systems were more clearly integrated
with economic activity.
A significant feature of these bank privatization
operations was that the new banking systems did not
meet the objectives hoped for by the government,
because of the high cost of their finance and the seg-
mentation of the markets in which they operated.
This led the government to authorize the opening of
new national and regional banks earlier than origin-
ally planned, thus giving adrnittance to big NPGs
which had initially been excluded from the purchase
of banks in spite of their efforts to do so. This was
what happened in the cases of the Carso Group of
Carlos Slím and the Hermes Group of Carlos Hank
Rhon.
The buyers of the banks paid very high prices for
them, which is explained by the profit expectations
ensured by the initial forecast that the banking sector
would remain protected from outside competition up
to at least the end of this century, and by the great
growth prospects that existed due to the national
financial backlog caused by the years of crisis and
nationalization.
From the point of view of the business structure
of the sector, the privatization of the banks restored
the traditional duopoly exerted in the Mexican finan-
cial market by Banamex and Bancomer. As already
noted, however, new multi-regional powers are tend-
ing to grow up both on the basis of existing banks
and through the establishment of new ones.
Finally, it may be noted that these privatization
operations have not yet given rise to a stable system
of financial enterprises and groups. In the near future,
big changes may be expected in the sector both
through mergers and associations among existing
banks and through the establishment of major new
banks and the association of local and foreign banks
with a view to the Free Trade Agreement with the
United States and Canada.
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III
Conclusions: a preliminary profile
of national private groups in 1993
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By way of a general conclusion, we could say
that the main result of the reform processes
carried out in Mexico since 1989, both at the
TABLE 10
macroeconomic and the individual company leve!,
is that the NPGs are taking on a new profile
(table 10).
Mexico: Categories of traditional and new
national prlvate groups, August 1993
Type of group
Traditional
Visa
Vitro
Desc
New groups
Carso
Hermes
Cabal Peniche
Maseca
Alcántara
Cremi
Rodríguez
Pulsar
Prime
Origin: Stock Market
New groups:
Banamex - Accival
MM-Probursa
Origin: Banking
Traditional group:
Comermex - Inverlat
Traditional groups
Alfa
Cemex
Peñoles
Televisa
lea
Comercial Mexicana
Cifra
Gigante
New groups
Salinas
GemexlEscorpi6n
Financia!
Bancomer
Serfín - übsa
Mexicano - Inverméxico
Inbursa
Interacciones
BCH
Banorte
Bancrecer
Cremi
Banpafs
"La República"
insurance company
Internacional - Prime
Banamex - Accival
MM-Probursa
Comermex - Inverlat
Industrial
Economic and financial groups
Cervecería Cuauhtémoc
Vitro
Various
Condumextrelmex
Transport, trucks
Del Monte
Maseca
Transport
Dina
Transport
Cervecería Modelo
Financial groups
Industrial groups
Iron and steeVfoodlothers
Cernent
Mining
Television/radio/press
Construction/others
Self-service stores
Self-service stores
Self-service stores
Elektratrelevisi6n Azteca
Pepsi-Colalsugar refineries
Commerce/services
Sanboms
Fruit packing, hotels
Commerce/cinemas
Source: Prepared by Ihe author on the basis of data from the press, documents and the Mexican Stock Exchange.
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Above aH, we are witnessing the emergence of a
set of economic and financial groups as a result of
the bank privatization process, combined with the
sale of public industrial enterprises in sorne cases.
Within these groups, on the 000 hand there are the
groups which had traditionally existed in the country
and which reappeared after the nationalization of the
banks in the 1980s, while on the other hand there is a
considerable number of new economic and fmancial
groups of predominantly industrial origin, which
seem to be forming the base for a new business
leadership in the country. There are also some indus-
trial or commercial groups which have incorporated
or hope to incorporate banks and other financial in-
termediaries into their structure. A point worthy of
note is the regional origin of most of these groups, as
well as the major presence in them of business inter-
ests connected with the transport sector.
Outstanding among the new groups is the
Carso Group, which, through the stockbroking and
investment firm Inbursa, gained control during
these years of various companies or private groups
such as Condumex, Nacobre, Sanborns and Minera
Frisco, along with the acquisition of Telmex and
now the opening of a national bank which will
foreseeably compete with Banamex and Bancomer.
Another important change is the formation of
financial groups under the leadership of one or other
of the stockbroking and investment firms which
were so successful during the period of nationaliza-
tion of the banks. In order to appraise the special
features of this new type of group, it must be re-
called that when the banks were privatized it seemed
that they were going to be adjudicated to the stock-
broking and investment firms, which were the new
private financial power. The final result of the pri-
vatization process was different, however, and only
three of the financial groups which acquired banks
were of this origino
An· undoubtedly significant fact is that these
groups inelude the Banamex-Accival group, which,
under this new structure, became the leading finan-
cial entity in Latin America and now occupies posi-
tion No. 257 among the thousand biggest banks in
the world, according to The Banker. In order to gain
a fuller idea of the implications of this position it
may be noted that the stock market basis of this
bank is due to its two main leaders: Alfredo Harp
and Roberto Hernández, who are the owners of the
Accival stockbroking and investment firm which
purchased the bank. Among the other shareholders
there are many important figures from big Mexican
non-fmancial enterprises, however. The distinctive
feature of this type of group is that its activities are
centered on the world of finance, and especially
the stock market, although this could change if the
Banamex-Accival group confirms its entry into the
field of telephone services.
This sector of the financial groups also ineludes
the only example of the return of one of the tradi-
tional bankers: Agustín F. Legorreta, who had been
the owner of Banamex in the past and is now the
leader of the Comermex-Inverlat group.
The third and last category of groups presented
here ineludes those of predominantly industrial
origin, especially restructured traditional groups, al-
though there are also very successful new and grow-
ing groups, such as the Elektra or Gemex-Escorpión
groups.
This situation of relative weakness of the new
industrial groups compared with the traditional ones
may be interpreted as proof that the Mexican econ-
omy has still not developed a sustained cyele of in-
vestment and growth capable of promoting such
business development, but there is sufficient latent
economic and business energy to bring this about if
such a cyele can be established.
If this is so and these conditions are fulfilled,
then it rnay be expected that in the coming years the
process of change in the structure of Mexican private
capital analysed in this artiele may come to fruition,
thus not only consolidating and expanding this seg-
ment of new groups but also having an integrative
effect on medium-sized and small firms and thereby
strengthening the country's rather weak business
structure.
(Original: Spanish)
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